Marquette University Law School

Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2012

The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of
2011
Paul M. Secunda
Marquette University Law School, paul.secunda@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011, 27 ABA J. Lab. & Emp. L.
293 (2012). Copyright © 2012 American Bar Association. This information or any portion thereof
may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an
electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar
Association.
Repository Citation
Secunda, Paul M., "The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011" (2012). Faculty Publications. Paper 603.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/603

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

293

The Wisconsin Public-Sector
Labor Dispute of2011
Paul M. Secunda*
I.

Introduction
On Valentine's Day, February 14, 2011, the new conservative Republican Governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, dropped a "bomb." 1 He
publicly introduced a "budget repair bill," Senate Bill 10, 2 to limit
state public-sector unions' ability to bargain collectively with their employers over wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of work.
This anti-collective bargaining bill, later known as Wisconsin Act 10,
was supposedly a necessary reaction to the effects of the global economic crisis on the state budget. 3 Yet, to many Wisconsinites, the Governor's actions appeared to be an exercise in political retribution
rather than budgetary restraint.
What was so surprising was not only the unprecedented attack on
public-sector bargaining, but that such action did not square at all

*Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I am indebted to
Sophie Robin-Olivier and Pascal Lokiec for organizing the Round Table at the Universite
Paris Ouest Nanterre Ia Defense on June 3, 2011, which led to the drafting of this paper.
I also thank Marty Malin for his efforts in reviewing this article. All errors or omissions
in this paper are mine alone. Disclosure: the author informally advised, without compensation, Wisconsin public-sector unions and their law firms on litigation strategy and protest tactics during 2011.
1. See Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Says He Campaigned on His Budget Repair
Plan, Including Curtailing Collective Bargaining, PoLITIFACT Wrs. (Feb. 22, 2011), http://
www.politifact.com/wisconsinlstatements/2011/feb/22/scott-walker/wisconsin-gov-scottwalker-says-he-campaigned-his- ("[A] conversation surfaced between Walker and a person impersonating Walker campaign contributor and industrialist David Koch. In an
audiotape released Feb. 23, 2011, Walker compares his union plan to a history-making
act and portrayed his union plan as a 'bomb.'"). The transcript of the prank call can be
found at: http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/116751499.html. See also Wis. Educ.
Ass'n Council v. Walker, 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30,
2012) ("With the passage of 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, denominated the "Budget Repair
Bill," the State of Wisconsin took a sweeping right turn from a half century of developments in the rights of its public employees to unionize, collectively bargain and collect
union dues.").
2. 2011 Wis. Act 10, http://legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/data!JR1SB-1l.pdf(last visited
Jan. 30, 2012).
3. See A. G. Sulzberger & Monica Davey, Union Bonds in Wisconsin Begin to Fray,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/us/22union.html ("Mr.
Walker, the new Republican governor who has proposed the cuts to benefits and bargaining rights, argu[es] that he desperately needs to bridge a deficit expected to reach $3.6
billion for the coming two-year budget.").
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with the positive history of public-sector labor relations in Wisconsin. 4
In 1959, Wisconsin was the very first state to enact public-sector
bargaining laws 5 similar to those provisions adopted under the National Labor Relations Act. 6 Yet, Governor Walker maintained that
there was a short-term deficit of about $140 million through June 30,
2011, and a long-term deficit of some $3.6 billion. 7 Walker believed
those deficits could be more quickly erased by severely disabling public-sector union bargaining power.
However, the economic conditions surrounding the recession did
not require enactment of Act 10. While the law certainly had economic
and social implications, its motivation appeared to be largely a matter
of partisan politics. Unions, whether public or private, are democratic
organizations that provide workers a collective voice in society and in
the workplace. They also act as a countervailing force to employers,
employer organizations, and governments that promote business interests at the expense of working people. In other words, Act 10
appeared to be a political initiative by American conservatives to
undermine unions as the champion of lower- and middle-class voters
and to aggrandize their own political power in the process. The fact
that similar attacks against public unions took place simultaneously
across the country suggests conservative anti-union groups orchestrated these reforms. Indeed, Wisconsin set the tone for similar anticollective bargaining legislative movements in the public sector in
Florida, Indiana, Nevada, Michigan, and Ohio. 8
4. See Kevin M. Kniffin, Organizing to Organize: The Case of a Successful Long·
Haul Campaign for Collective Bargaining Rights, 36 LAB. STUD. J. 333, 334 (2011) ("In
the case of Wisconsin, the state's rich history of union organizing contrasted sharply
with the newly elected governor's proposal and-undoubtedly-played a supporting role
in the mass actions that became common national news stories.").
5. See Jason Stein & Patrick Marley, Walker Budget Plan Would Limit State Un·
ions to Negotiating Only on Salaries, Mn,WAUJ<EE J. SENTINEL (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.
jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/1157267-54.html ("Unlike unions of private-sector workers, which are governed by federal law, state and Joca1 unions in Wisconsin are largely
govemed by two 40-year-old state laws .... State unions are covered under the State
Employment Labor Relations Act [Wts. 8TA1~ §§ 111.80-111.94], and school and local government unions are covered under the Municipal Employment Relations Act IWts. STAT.
§§ 111.70-111.77]."); see also Kniffin, supra note 4, at 336 ("With a history that includes
ligures such as 'Fighting Bob' La Follette along with policy innovations such as unemployment insurance and workers' compensation, Wisconsin has often been recognized as
'a Progressive showcase for social legislation.'") (citations omitted).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006). 'fhe NLRA only applies to private-sector workers,
not to public-sector workers. I d. § 152(2).
7. See Stein & Marley, supra note 5.
8. See Editorial, Gov. Walher's Pretext, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/02/18/opinion/18fril.html; see also Kniffin, supra note 4, at 334
("[B)oth proponents and opponents of the governor's proposa1 to &·ode coUective bar·
gaining rights presumed that Wisconsin's legislature and governor WCI'e establishing a
new 'test' pattern that would influence actions in other states (e.g., Ohio).' ). For a survey of state enactments, see Martin H. Ma1i.n, The Legislative Upheaual in PublicSector Labor Law: A Search for Common Elemer1ts, 27 A.B.A. J. LAa. & EMP. L. 149 (2012).
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More specifically, Walker's claim that Act 10's anti-collective bargaining approach was required to balance Wisconsin's budget is belied
by two unassailable facts. First, there were a number of provisions in
the law including an annual union recertification requiJ·ement and an
anti-dues checkoff provision, which had absolutely nothing to do with
cost savings. 9 Second, and perhaps even more tellingly, when Act 10
was finally enacted, Walker and his allies in the legislatUTe employed
a legislative procedure which could only be utilized if Act 10 did not
have any impact on state fiscal policy. In short Governor Walker used
the economic crisis, and, more specificaUy Wisconsin's budget situation, as a ruse to enact a punitive bill against public-sector unions.
Although unions and their allies have drafted, and continue to
draft, procedural and substantive legal challenges to Act 10 based on
state open meeting laws and constitutionally-based freedom of speech
provisions and Equal Protections provisions, these legal challenges,
with some notable exceptions, have been largely unsuccessfu1. 10 The
subsequent loss of workplace rights not only adversely impacts publicsector workers, but also the citizens of Wisconsin, who will be stuck
with a demoralized and likely less effective public-sector work force.
II. The Remarkable Story Behind the Enactment
of Wisconsin Act 10
When Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker announced his intention
to hold an emergency budget repair session to address the state's
short-term and long-term budget deficit, some observers were taken
aback by his proposed radical departure from past labor relations
practices. But as Walker freely admitted, and given Walker's notoriety
as being an ardent opponent of public-sector unions as the former Milwaukee County Executive, one would have had to have been asleep
not to see this move coming. 11 Wall<:er argued that overly-generous labor

l), http://www.
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9. Indeed, in striking down the recertification and anti-dues checkoff provisions
for non-public safety employees, the district court found that there was little to no connection between Act lO's asserted justifications and these plainly punitive provisions.
See Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790, at *1-2 (W.D.
Wis. Mar. 30, 2012).
10. Though initially successful at trial, a divided Wisconsin Supreme Court over·
turned the open meeting law challenges. See State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.
W.2d 436, 438 (Wis. 2011). The Ozarme decision is currenUy the subject of a m.otion for
relief from judgment. See District Attorney's Motion for Recusal of Justice Michael
Gableman and for Relief from Judgment, State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, No.
2011AP000613-LV (Wis. Dec. 30, 20ll). As far as the Equal Protection and free speech
challenges, the District Court for the Western Disb·ict of Wisconsin upheld the anticollective bargaining provisions, but enjoined the dues checkoff and -recertification provisions. See Wis. Educ. Ass'" Council, 2012 WL 1068790, at "'3-4.
11. At a February 22, 2011, press conference, Walker stated that, "[t]he simple
matter is I campaigned on (passing anti-collective bargaining legislation] throughout
the election. Anybody who says they are shocked on this has been asleep for the past two
years." See POLITIFACT W1s., supra note 1. ln Mru·ch of 2010, then-Milwaukee County
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contracts, which he asserted gave 200,000 Wisconsin public workers lucrative salaries, pension benefits, and health insurance, had finally
taken an insuperable financial toll on the state. 12
Walker had the advantage of Republican majorities in both the
Wisconsin State Senate and the General Assembly and sought to fasttrack Act 10. Although the majority was smaller in the Senate, Republican leadership thought that Walker could propose his plan without
negotiating with Democrats and ram his bill through both chambers.
The Democrats in the legislature, for their part, made it clear that the
proposed "budget repair bill" really had nothing to do with fixing the
state's budget and characterized the bid as an unacceptable attack on
public unions. 13 Indeed, Act 10 would strip the rights of most public
employees to bargain over most terms and conditions of employment.
As far as collective bargaining, public workers were still permitted
to bargain over wages, but such bargaining was limited to no more
than the year's inflation rate. 14 If the public employees wanted wage
increases beyond the rate of inflation, they would have to initiate a
costly and time-consuming statewide referendum. 15 Additionally, in a
move that many thought was aimed to divide and conquer publicsector unions, Walker conspicuously excluded public safety officers
(i.e., police, firefighters, and paramedics) from coverage under Act 10. 16
Executive Walker asserted that a financial emergency allowed him to lay off twenty-six
unionized courthouse security guards and contract the work to a private company. Yet,
the County Board had rejected the outsourcing idea just months before Walker's unilateral action. Rejecting Walker's asserted financial emergency, in January of 2011, an arbitrator reinstated the security guards with backpay. Steve Schultze, Milwaukee County
Must Offer to Reinstate Courthouse Security Guards, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Jan. 10,
2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/113212479 .html.
12. Later studies of public-sector compensation show that public-sector workers
make less in compensation in Wisconsin than similarly-situated private-sector workers.
See Jeffrey H . Keefe, Are Wisconsin Public Employees Over-compensated?, 290 EcoN.
PoL'Y lNST. 1 (Feb. 10, 2011), http://epi.3cdn.neU9e237c56096a8e4904_rkm6b9hnl.pdf;
see also Jeffrey H. Keefe, State and Local Public Employees: Are They Overcompensated?, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 239 (2012).
13. See, e.g., Scott Walker's Top Ten Lies, MARK PaeAN (Feb. 19, 2011, 6:52 PM),
http://markpocanwi.blogspot.com/2011/02/scott-walkers-top-ten-lies.html. Mark Pocan
represents the 78th District in the Wisconsin State Assembly.
14. Id. The inflation rate is calculated by measuring the Consumer Price Index for
a year's period ending on a date 180 days prior to the expiration of the contract. Thus,
for contracts ending March 31, 2012, the maximum possible increase is 2.65%; for contracts ending June 30, 2012, the maximum possible increase is 3.16%. Consumer Price
Index Calculation Developments and Chart, Wis. EMP. REL. CoMMISSION (Mar. 19, 2012),
http://werc.wi.gov/selected_press_releases_and_werc_world_articles.htm#pi_developments_
and_chart.
15. Stein & Marley, supra note 5.
16. Ezra Klein, What Is Actually Being Proposed in Wisconsin ?, WASH.PosT.COM
(Feb. 18, 2011), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2011/02/what_is_actually_
being_ propose.html. While Act 10 permits "public safety officers" to bargain collectively,
its definition of "public safety officer" excludes certain law enforcement officers. For example, under Act 10, officers employed by the Wisconsin State Capital Police and University of Wisconsin-Madison Police Department are not considered public safety
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If those were the worst parts of Act 10, that would have been
quite enough. However, there were a number of clearly punitive provisions that made it more difficult for public-sector unions effectively to
organize their workers. Chief among these punitive provisions were
annual recertification provisions and anti-dues checkoff provisions. 17
The annual recertification provisions required already-existing unions
annually to recertify that they continued to represent a majority of the
employees. Snuck into this provision was the harsh condition that not
just a majority of those voting had to vote for the union, but at least
51% of all employees, voting or not, had to vote for recertification. 18
This bargaining-unit-wide majority provision made it much more difficult for unions to be recertified as the representative of their
employees. 19
The anti-union dues checkoff provision makes it unlawful for public employers to withhold monthly union dues from employees' paychecks. 2 For administrative convenience, dues checkoff provisions
had been a staple of both private-sector and public-sector collective
bargaining contracts. Without the ability to collect union dues in this
efficient manner, under Act 10, unions will have to spend more of their
time tracking down members to collect dues and less time on everyday
union duties such as processing grievances. 21

°

officers, making them subject to Act 10. See State Agents, DNR Wardens Not Exempt
From Walker Cuts, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/
statepolitics/116502363.html (noting distinction between certain classes of law enforcement officers).
17. Klein, supra note 16.
18. Act 10 requires unions representing general employees, but not those representing "public safety" employees, to undergo annual automatic recertification elections
to retain their status as the certified bargaining representatives, regardless of whether
any represented employee actually seeks a vote. See 2011 Wis. Act 10, §§ 242, 289, 9132,
9155, http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/acts/10.pdf. A union subject to a recertification election under Act 10 is decertified unless at least fifty-one percent of those eligible to vote cast ballots in favor of retaining the union. Id. § 242.
19. As it turned out, many unions decided not to recertify and took on a more informal association status. See Scott Bauer, Wis. Unions Decide to Skip Recertification Votes,
BosTON.COM (Sept. 23, 2011), http:l/articles.boston.com/2011-09-23/news/30194694_1_
wisconsin-unions-recertification-votes-collective-bargaining. But see Matthew DeFour,
Nearly All State Teachers Unions Without Pact Seek Recertification, Wise. ST. J. (Oct. 13,
20 11), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/educationllocal_schools/article_14 750bcaffi1e-lleO-b9d0-001cc4c002eO.html?ixzz1e5vF02YS ("Of 156 local teachers unions in
school districts that did not extend a collective bargaining agreement for this year, 144all but 12-filed with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission to hold votes
later this fall.").
20. Act 10 prohibits state and municipal employers from deducting union dues for
employees, including for employees who desire the deductions and present their employers with written authorizations. See 2011 Wis. Act 10, §§ 58, 227, 298, http://docs.legis.
wisconsin.gov/201llrelated/acts/10.pdf.
21. One of the plaintiffs in the federal lawsuit against Act 10, the Wisconsin Education Association, estimated "that the loss of an automatic dues deduction option for its
voluntary members will amount in an additional $375,000 reduction in the portion of its
dues contributions set aside for certain types of political activity." Wis. Educ. Ass'n
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Many Wisconsinites were outraged by the Governor's proposal.
There were massive demonstrations throughout February and March
of 2011 in Madison, with as many as 100,000 protestors marching on
the State Capitol to show their displeasure with Walker's attack on
public unions. 22 The protests in support of public-sector bargaining
rights were not limited to Wisconsin, 23 and they received international
attention. 24
Meanwhile, Democratic members of the two houses of the Wisconsin Legislature undertook different strategies to prevent a final vote on
the bill. Democratic Assembly members, vastly outnumbered, sought to
introduce endless amendments to make their Republican colleagues
take unpopular votes, but also to stall a vote on the final bill. Although
this approach had some success, Act 10, unmodified by any amendment,
was passed easily in the Republican-controlled Assembly.
In the more closely divided Senate, quite a different series of
events unfolded. In that chamber, Republicans held a nineteen to fourteen majority over Democrats. However, because in its initial form the
budget repair bill included concededly fiscal measures, a sixty percent
supermajority vote was necessary for passage. This required that at
least twenty senators vote for the bill. Not only would the Democratic
state senators not agree to support Act 10, they physically fled from
Wisconsin to the neighboring state of Illinois, hoping to ensure that
there would be no quorum to act on the Governor's budget repair
bill. 25 Republicans responded by calling on the state police to round up
Council v. Walker, 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2012)
(emphasis in original). When the New York City MTA transportation union lost its ability
to use dues checkoff in 2005-06, the President of the Transport Workers Union swore in
an affidavit that ninety percent of the Union's income came from dues checkoffs from employees. Because of the loss of the dues checkoff, the MTA Union had to have its staff focus
almost exclusively on collecting dues. See MTA Bus Co. v. TWU, No. 2005-37468, 2005 WL
6242982 (N.Y Sup. 2005) (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) ("Our staff has been
deployed to the field in an aggressive campaign to push our members to pay their dues ....
In spite of these efforts, we have experienced a significant drop in income.").
22. See James B. Kelleher, Up to 100,000 Protest Wisconsin Law Curbing Unions,
REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/13/usa-wisconsin-idUSN
1227540420110313. This was as large as the biggest crowd of protestors in Madison
during the Vietnam War; see also James Kelleher & David Bailey, Largest Crowds Since
Vietnam War March in Wisconsin, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/02/26/us-wisconsin-protests-idUSTRE7104F420110226.
23. Joe Newby, Thousands Protest in Los Angeles in Support of Public Sector Unions, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/conservative-in-spokane/
thousands-protest-los-angeles-support-of-public-sector-unions.
24. See, e.g., Roger Wilkinson, Wisconsin Unions Rally for Rights, AL-JAZEERA (Feb.
20, 2011), http://english.aljazeera.net/video/americas/2011/02/2011220115031136309.html
("In the state of Wisconsin, roughly 100,000 people turned up for a fifth straight day of
protests. Public sector workers accuse the state's Republican governor of using the [financial] crisis as a reason to attack their union rights.").
25. Andrea Billups, Wis. Dems Flee to Avoid Anti-Union Vote; Other States Eye Similar Measures, WABHINGTONTIMES.COM (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/20 11/feb/17/wisconsin-democrats-flee-avoid-anti-union-bill-vot/?page=all.
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the lawmakers and bring them back to Madison, but the state police
had no power to bring the Democratic state senators back from
Illinois. 26
Unable to goad the Democratic state senators back to Wisconsin,
Governor Walker and his Republican allies in the legislature devised a
new plan they believed would not require a supermajority vote on
Act 10.27 On March 9, 2011, with little notice, the Senate majority leader, Scott Fitzgerald, quickly held a special conference committee
meeting with representatives from the Wisconsin Senate and Assembly. He introduced a new version of the bill, which was said not to have
any fiscal provisions and, therefore, needed only a normal majority
vote. Although the Democrats present at this conference committee,
including Assembly Minority Leader Peter Barca, vehemently objected
to this unusual legislative process, the amended bill was first passed
by the conference committee and then by simple majorities in the Senate
and the House. 28 On March 11, 2011, Governor Walker signed Act 10
into law with all ofthe same anti-collective bargaining provisions.
Ismael Ozanne, the Democratic district attorney for Dane County,
immediately challenged Act 10. 29 The lawsuit alleged that enactment
of Act 10 violated Wisconsin's open meetings law, 30 which requires
that the public and interested parties be given adequate notice before
legislation is considered. The lawsuit maintained that such notice was
lacking under the open meetings law and, therefore, the legislative
process had to be redone with proper notice. On May 26, 2011, the
trial court voided Act 10, finding that th e manner of th e law's enactment violated the open meetings law. 31
26. Id .
27. Patrick Mal'ley & Lee Bergquist, With Democrats A bsent, Republicans Advance Collective Bargaini11g Changes, M TLWAUJU:E J. SENTINEL (Mar. 9, 2011), h ttp://www.
jsonline.com/newslstatepoliti.cs/11'7656563.html ("Just before the Senate vote, a committee stripped some fi nancial elements from the bill which they said allowed them to pass
it with the presence of a simple majority. The most controversial parts of the bill remain
intact.").
28. Id.
29. Dane County is the county in which Madison, the capital of Wisconsin, is
located.
30. See W1s. S·rAT. §§ 19.31-.39 (2011).
31. See Oznnne v. Fitzgerald, No. 11-CV-1244, 2011 WL 2176815 (Wis. Cil'. May 26,
2011 ). During this srune time period, conse1vative supporters of Walker were seeking to
silence ct·itics of Act 10 through public record act requests seeking the emails of prominent public university professors. The most notorious example of such tactics was by
the Wisconsin Republican Party, which sought to gag the expression of University of
Wisconsin-Madison history professor William Cron on . Dr. Cronon h ad written an op-ed
in the New York Times about the ongoing dispute surrounding the Wiscons in budget repair bill. Based on the fact that similar conservative legislation was percolating in many
state legislatu res throughout the country, Dr. Cronon surmised that the Amel'ican Legislative Exchange Conference (ALEC) and other conservative advocacy groups bad crafted
Walker's anti-union legislation. Dr. Cronon did not draw any ultimate conclusions on
t hese matte.r s but only suggested that other people conduct research to determine what
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The Act 10 story subsequently became even more convoluted and
bizarre. Justice David Prosser of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, a conservative on the seven-member court, had come up for reelection for
another ten-year term. Including Justice Prosser, there were four conservative Justices and three progressive Justices. If Justice Prosser
lost his election, the court would flip to a progressive majority, and the
thought was that the court would uphold the trial judge's decision. As
it turned out, Justice Prosser barely defeated his progressive challenger after an April 6, 2011 formal recount, keeping a four-to-three conservative majority. 32
In June of 2011, just two months after his reelection, after
a heated argument over whether the court should uphold the open
meetings law violation, allegations arose that Justice Prosser had attempted physically to choke a fellow Supreme Court Justice, progressive Justice Ann Walsh Bradley. 33 Although Justice Prosser was later
cleared of any criminal conduct, 34 many people wondered what impact
this event had on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's June 14, 2011 fourrole ALEC and these other conservative clearinghouses had played in the Wisconsin
labor crisis. The University of Wisconsin was subsequently served with a public records
request from the Wisconsin Republican Party that demanded all of Dr. Cronan's university emails that included certain political terms (including Scott Walker, recall, Republican, and collective bargaining) from January 1, 2011, and beyond. John Nichols, Wisconsin GOP Seeks to Silence a Distinguished Dissenter. McCarthyism Is Back, THE NATION
(Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/blog/159489/wisconsin-gop-seeks-silencedistinguished-dissenter-mccarthyism-back. At the time, I criticized the Wisconsin GOP
in my own blog post, concluding:
[T]he Wisconsin Republican party is seeking to chill [Dr. Cronan's] speech in
order to further self-serving political aims. The intent of such requests appears to be nothing less than to suppress efforts to disseminate important information about whether out-of-state conservative organizations are funding
legislation being pushed currently by the Wisconsin governor.
Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Republican Party Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks,
ACS BLDG (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-wisconsin-republicanparty-doth-protest-too-much-me thinks.
32. Larry Sandler & Patrick Marley, Prosser, Kloppenburg Virtually Deadlocked as
Supreme Court Race Remains Tight, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.
jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/119303544.html ("Interest groups on both sides had portrayed the election as a referendum on Gov. Scott Walker's agenda and particularly on a
controversial law sharply restricting public employee unions. Conservatives backed
Prosser, and liberals supported Kloppenburg, even though the candidates themselves
insisted they were politically neutral.").
33. Reid J. Epstein, Cops Look Into David Prosser "Choke Hold" Charge, PoLITICO
(June 27, 2011), http://www.politico.com/newslstories/0611/57835.html ("Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice David Prosser is again in the middle of a partisan storm-this time
over shocking allegations he choked a colleague in her chambers during an altercation
over Gov. Scott Walker's union-busting budget bill.").
34. As this article goes to press, the Wisconsin Judicial Commission has a pending
ethics complaint against Justice Prosser for his conduct towards Justice Bradley.
See John Israel, Justice PI'Osser Attempts To Kill Ethics Case Against Him By Asking All
Colleagues To Recuse Themselves, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 21, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://think
progress.org/justice/2012/03/21/448919/prosser-attempts-to-kill-ethics-case/?mobile=nc.

II

to-th·
Act 1
pro vi
reasc
wrott
to ta:
In th
I
dram
ofRe
lectiv
be fil
since
ally 1:
blyw
her 2
faced
plus-1
and£
effort
sixteE
Act 1'

3
3
T
n
Cl
Cl
Cl

3
longer
is long
the ord
3:
at *4 ('
3!
docvie•
41
the pre
Races,:
recall-e
primari
Recall.
http://v
kleefisc
4:

N.Y. Til

~012)

,~oluted

and
a con!election for
rre four contice Prosser
:ity, and the
decision. As
l.ive challeno-three con~ourt,

JCtion, after
ld the open
sser had atice, progres1le r was later
what impact
~. 2011 four. the Wisconsin
public records
ronan's univerrecall, RepubliHchols, Wiscon·
:ck, THE NATION
p-seeks-silenceWisconsin GOP

l

speech in (I
!Uests aplOrtant in~e funding

fuch, Methinks,
tsin-republicanYDeadlocked as
11), http://www.
h. sides had por•articularly on a
:-vatives backed
'ltes themselves
~harge, POLITICO
("Wisconsin Sutorm-this time
g an altercation

1'1 has a pending
fustice Bradley.
m By Aski1!g All
U\1), http:l/think
el?mobile=nc.

The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of2011

301

to-three ruling to vacate the judgment of the trial court and permit
Act 10 to go into effect. 35 Justice Prosser wrote a vitriolic concurrence
providing a pro-Walker tilt to the political background of Act 10 and
reasons for finding no violation. 36 Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson
wrote a scathing dissent which took Justice Prosser and the majority
to task for rushing publication of the decision for political reasons. 37
In the end, Act 10 went into effect on June 28, 2011. 38
Following affirmation of Act 10's lawful enactment, yet another
drama was playing out. Union supporters had vowed to seek the recall
of Republican state senators who had voted to strip public-sector collective bargaining rights. Wisconsin recall laws only permit recalls to
be filed against those who have been in office for at least one year
since their last election. 39 This meant Governor Walker could not initially be subjected to recall, nor could any members of the State Assembly who had all just been reelected to a new two-year term in November 2010. Instead, six Republican and three Democratic state senators
faced recall efforts in July and August of 2011. 40 The outcome was a
plus-two gain for Democrats, as all Democrats retained their seats
and four out of the six Republicans targeted retained theirs. The recall
efforts reduced the Republican majority to a wafer thin seventeen to
sixteen. 41 Of course, these first recall efforts did not repeal or amend
Act 10.

35. State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436 (Wis. 2011).
36. I d. at 447. Justice Prosser's concurrence noted:
The circuit court concluded that the legislature should have provided public
notice of the special session conference committee 24 hours in advance. The
court did not acknowledge that thousands of demonstrators stormed and occupied the State Capitol within a few hours of the notice that a conference
committee meeting would be held.
37. Id. at 451 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("Justice Prosser's concurrence is
longer than the order. The concurrence consists mostly of a statement of happenings. It
is long on rhetoric and long on story-telling that appears to have a partisan slant. Like
the order, the concurrence reaches unsupported conclusions.").
38. See Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790,
at *4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2012).
39. See Recall Elections, Wis. DEP'T OF ELECTIONS, http://elections.state.wi.us/
docview.asp?docid=11827 &locid=4 7 (outlining recall procedures).
40. Republicans ran fake "Democrats" in the Democratic recall primaries to delay
the process. Wisconsin Recall Elections: Six Fake Democrats Force Primaries in Recall
Races, HUFFPOST PoL. (July 12, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/12/wisconsinrecall-elections_n_895537.html. Undeterred, Republicans plan to run fake Democrats in the
primaries leading up to the Walker recall election. See Patrick Marley, GAB Sets Historic
Recall Elections; GOP to Field Fake Democrats, MiLWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/gab-sets-historic-recall-elections-for-walkerkleefisch-t04q7k6-145152265 .html.
41. Monica Davey, Republicans Hold On to Wisconsin Senate After Recall Vote,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2011), http://nytimes.com/2011!08/10/us/politics/lOwisconsin.html.
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Nor will the effort to recall Governor Walker, which began on
November 15, 2011 and will culminate in a June 8, 2012 recall election,42 lead to a repeal of Act 10. Though the recall supporters
had only sixty days to collect 540,000 petition signatures to recall
Walket; the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board certified over
900,000 recall signatures.43
Yet, even if the recall of Governor Walker is successful, it will
likely not alter the continuing effects of Act 10. This is because, in
order to repeal the law, one of three events will have to happen. First,
Democratic majorities will likely have to be elected in both the State
Senate and Assembly. Although, in the Senate, this may happen in
due course through additional 1·ecalls and elections, it is unlikely to
happen in the near future in the Assembly where Republican majorities are more substantial. 44 A Democratic governor would be powerless to undo the damage to public-sector unions without majorities in
both legislative houses that are willing to overturn Act 10.
Second, supporters of public-sector unions can follow an approach
other states have used by seeking to enshrine the right of public-sector
bargaining in the Wisconsin Constitution.45 '!'his approach would have
the advantage of not only immediately repealing Act 10, but making it
less likely that attacks against public unions could take place again in
the future. Although this appears to lead to the best results for those
who support public-sector bargaining, the process is even more cumbersome than the recall effort and, of course, there is no guarantee
that Wisconsin state voters would support such an initiative.46
42. Governor Walker, along with Lieutenant Governor Rebecca Kleefisch and four
additional Republican state senators, will be subject to the 2012 recall process. The re·
call primaries will be held on May 8, 2012, and the general recall election will take place
on June 5, 2012. See Tim Jones, Al.l ·Out Walker War Ahead as Wisconsin Board Approves Recall, BLOOMBERG BusJNESSWB&K (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2012-03-30/all-out-walker-war-Jooms-as-wisconsin-recall-uncertainty-ends.
43. See id. 540,000 signatures represents twenty-five percent of the people who
voted in the November 2010 gubernatorial election.
44. Redistricting bas made legislative change even more unlikely as "(al threejudge panel of the U.S. District CourL for the Eastern District of Wisconsin ... upheld all
but two state legislative districts drawn by a Republican·controlled Wisco1tsin Legislature. It also upheld a congressional redistricting map." See Joe Forward, Federal Court
Panel Largely Upholds Republican·Drawn Legislative Redistricting Maps, ST. BAR W1s.
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://ww-.Y.wisbar.org/AM!l'emplate.cfm?Section=News&Template=/
CMJContentDisplay.cfm&ContentiD=l09866. See also id. ("The panel lamented on the
secrecy and partisan nature of this cycle's redistricting process.").
45. For example, Missouri has a right to organize and to engage 'in collective bargaining in its state constitution. Joseph E. Slater, Lessons from the Public Sector: Suggestions and a Calltion, 94 MARq. L. RJ>v. 917, 927 (2011) ("In 1945, Missouri added the
following clause to its state constitution: 'IE]mployees shall have the right to organize
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.'") (quoting
Mo. Const. art. I, § 29).
46. See Steve Miller, Govern Wisconsitl: Amending the Wisconsin Constitution,
W1s. LEGJS. Re~'RRENCE BuREAu (2008), http://legis.wisconsin.govllr1Ygw/gw_26.pdf (stating
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The third, and final, approach 47 depends on litigation in the federal courts. Unlike the open meetings law litigation in Wisconsin state
courts, this litigation more broadly argues that Act 10 is in violation of
federal constitutional rights of free speech and Equal Protection. 48 On
March 30, 2012, the district court upheld the anti-collective bargaining provisions against an Equal Protection attack, and struck down
the dues checkoff and recertification provisions as in violation of
Equal Protection and First Amendment free speech rights. 49 More specifically, the court held:
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[P]lainti:ffs have not met their burden with t·espect to their Equal
Protection challenge to Act lO's ptincipal provisions limiting the collective bargaining rights of general employees and their unions. The
State, however, has ·not articulated, and the court is now satisfied
cannot articulate, a rational basis for picking and choosing from
among public unions, those (1) that must annually obtain an absolute majority of its voluntary members to remain in existence or
(2) that are entitled to voluntary, assistance with fundraising by
automatic deduction, at least not a rational basis that does not
offend the First Amendment. So long as the State of Wisconsin continues to afford ordinary certification and dues deductions to mandatory public safety unions with sweeping bargaining rights, there is
no rational basis to deny those rights to voluntal'Y general unions
with severely restricted bargaining rights.5°
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Interestingly, the unions attacking Act 10 did not even challenge
it on freedom of association grounds because the United States, unlike
Canada, 51 does not have a history of protecting constitutional rights to
picket or to bargain collectively. 52 In any event, it expected that both
sides to the dispute will now continue this litigation in the Seventh

constitutional amendments must pass both chambers of the legislature in separate legislati.ve sessions).
47. In addition, there is a fourth approach, which would have Wisconsin public employees shut down the state government by engaging in an unlawful general strike.
Although there was some early discussion about such a possibility among t he unions, a
general strike never did occur. Grace Wyler, Wisconsin Unions Call for Gen.eral Strilre,
Bus. INSiDER (Feb. 22, 2011), http:/Jarticles.businessinsider.com/2011-02-22/politics/
30092755_1_general-strike-bill-address-voters.
48. See Complaint, Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, No. 3:11-cv-00428-wmc
(W.D. Wis., filed June 15, 2011), http://wispolitics.com/1006/110615_Complaint_
M0460041_l.pdf.
49. See Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790,
at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2012).
50. Id.
51. See Ontario (AG) v. Fl'aser, 2011 SCC 20 [2011) 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (discussing
constitutional right to organize and collectively bargaining under Canadian law).
52. See, e.g., Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emp., 441 U.S. 463, 465 & n.2 (1979)
(per curiam) ("[T]he .F irst Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the
govexnment to listen to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargai n with it."); Dorchey v. Rro1sas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926) (holding that there is no absolute right to strike under the federal Constitution).
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Circuit Court of Appeals, and it is unclear to what extent non-public
safety public unions will continue to be burdened by Act 10 in the
future.

III. Conclusion
With some notable exceptions, including Illinois, 53 most governments, including the federal government and Wisconsin, have taken
an austerity approach to their current economic woes. Under this approach, the government contends that the only remedy is to cut government services to citizens and, by extension, public employment and
compensation. In this vein, Governor Walker has pledged that he will
not, under any circumstances, raise taxes. 54 Rather, he has cut taxes
for corporations by $130 million as a way to spur job growth in the
state. 55 Of course, cutting corporate taxes requires additional spending cuts and public employees are the perfect target when government
services need to be cut. They make up a relatively small percentage of
the total voting population and yet are perceived by voters to enjoy lucrative compensation packages, including great health care insurance
and pension plans.
Although it is generally true that public employees in Wisconsin
and other states have more generous health care plans and pension
plans, the overall compensation of employees tends to be less than
comparable private-sector workers. This is because compensation is
comprised of both wages and benefits, and wages for public-sector
workers in Wisconsin are less than comparable private-sector workers.
In the end, recent studies have shown that when looking at wages and
benefits together, public-sector workers make four to seven percent
less than comparable private-sector employees. 5 6
Furthermore, public employees, regardless of their ability to protest and bring public attention to the attacks on their unions, have a
mixed record in convincing fellow citizens to support their unions. On
the one hand, voters in Ohio recently voted by referendum, sixty-two
percent to thirty-eight percent, to repeal a similar anti-collective

53. Mark Guarino, Illinois Tax Increase: Why Lawmakers Passed 66 Percent Income-Tax Hike, CHRISTIAN Scr. MoNITOR (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
2011/0112/Illinois-tax-increase-why-lawmakers-passed-66-percent-income-tax-hike.
54. Walker has signed Grover Norquist's pledge not to raise taxes under any circumstances. Alison Fitzgerald, No-Tax "Zealot" Norquist Emerges as Biggest Barrier to
US. Deficit Deal, BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0524/norquist-emerges-as-barrier-to-u-s-debt-deal.html.
55. Editorial, supra note 8. In the period between February 2011 and February
2012, however, "[t]he largest over-the-year percentage decrease in employment occurred
in Wisconsin (-0.6 percent)." U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., NEWS RELEASE: REGIONAL AND STATE EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, Mar. 30, 2012, http://op.bna.com/
dlrcases.nsf/idllswr-8svmaf/$File/State%20Jobs%20Feb.pdf.
56. Keefe, supra note 12.
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bargaining bill. 57 Wisconsin does not have such a referendum process.
Moreover, even if the ongoing recall efforts of Republican state senators and Governor Walker are successful, as discussed above, such an
outcome will likely not lead to the repeal of Act 10. Although publicsector unions have had some success attacking Act 10 constitutionally
in federal court, so far what victories there have been have been partial ones.
At the end of the day, Governor Walker, and his allies in the legislature, have chosen to respond to budget deficits caused by the state's
economic crisis by scapegoating public-sector unions. The saga of the
enactment of Wisconsin Act 10, therefore, is a simple story about an
attack on public unions for exclusively political purposes. Yet, even
daunting economic problems, like the ones currently faced by Wisconsin, can be successfully addressed by governments without attacking
the basic workplace and democratic rights of public-sector workers.
The hope is that in the coming months and years that Wisconsin and
other states find less partisan ways to get their financial houses in
order.
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57. Rachel Weiner, Issue 2 Falls, Ohio Collective Bargaining Law Repealed, WASH.
PoST (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/issue-2-falls-ohiocollective-bargaining-law-repealed/2011/11/08/giQAyZOU3M_blog.html (noting that in
addition to Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, Texas Governor Rick Perry and Ohio Governor John Kasich have signed the pledge).

